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LEGAL MALPRACTICE IN VIRGINIA: TORT OR CONTRACT?
I. INTRODUCTION
A client who attempts to recover from an attorney does so because the
client feels that the attorney has acted negligently. The concepts of stan-
dard of care, negligence, and damages are usually associated with actions
in tort. However, while an examination of applicable Virginia law reveals
that concepts usually associated with tort apply to legal malpractice, the
presence of elements of negligence does not always equal tort.
Whether the cause of action for legal malpractice lies in tort or contract
is a question which troubles many Virginia attorneys. The principal
cause of this confusion is the nature of an action for legal malpractice. In
attempting to define the nature of a legal malpractice action, this com-
ment will examine the attorney standard of care, statutes of limitation,
and the question of recoverable damages.
II. STANDARD OF CARE
In 1796, the Virginia Supreme Court decided Stephens v. White,1 the
first reported legal malpractice case in the United States.2 In Stephens,
the court held that an attorney was liable to his client for legal malprac-
tice, provided the client could show that the attorney was guilty of "gross
negligence," and "that the attorney was employed [on the client's behalf]
.... ",3 Seventy-five years later, the court adopted an "ordinary negli-
gence" standard in Pidgeon v. Williams.4 The attorney standard of care
has evolved into one of reasonableness, a standard established in the 1951
case of Glenn v. Haynes.5 There, the court stated:
The law implies a promise on the part of attorneys that they will execute
the business intrusted to their professional management, with a reasonable
degree of care, skill, and dispatch, and they are liable to an action if guilty
of a default in either of these duties whereby their clients are injured, and
this liability of the attorney is not affected by the client's diligence or the
want of it, unless stipulated for by special contract ... and [the attorney]
is not to be answerable for every error or mistake, but on the contrary, will
be protected if he acts in good faith, to the best of his skill and knowledge,
and with an ordinary degree of attention.6
1. 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 203 (1796).
2. See Allied Productions, Inc. v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 764, 232 S.E.2d 774, 775
(1977).
3. 2 Va. (2 Wash.) at 212.
4. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 251, 254 (1871).
5. 192 Va. 574, 66 S.E.2d 509 (1951).
6. Id. at 581, 66 S.E.2d at 512-13 (quoting 2 R.C.L. Attorneys at Law § 95) (emphasis
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The Code of Virginia prescribes liability to the attorney "for any dam-
age sustained by [the client] by the neglect of [the attorney's] duty
. . " While there is no question that an attorney has a potential lia-
bility to his client for negligence, 8 he will only be liable if he violates the
"reasonable care and skill" standard of Glenn v. Haynes.' In addition, to
maintain an action for attorney malpractice the injured client must show
a breach of certain other duties in the attorney-client relationship.
The elements necessary to maintain an action for attorney malpractice
were enumerated by the Fourth Circuit in Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Price.10 The Virginia Supreme Court adopted these elements in Allied
Productions, Inc. v. Duesterdick.1 ' Quoting the Fourth Circuit, the Vir-
ginia Court stated that "[i]n a suit against an attorney for negligence, the
plaintiff must prove three things in order to recover: (1) the attorney's
employment; (2) his neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) that such negli-
gence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to the client."' 2
III. TORT OR CONTRACT?
The standard of care articulated in Glenn and the cases preceding it is
the source of the confusion in deciding whether an action for legal mal-
practice lies in tort or contract. The Glenn court couched its opinion in
terms of tort standards. However, a contract cause of action would also
seem appropriate, since the negligent attorney has failed to perform as he
has promised, or he has made a misrepresentation in the course of his
service which would constitute a breach of the attorney's oral implied
added). See Fowler v. American Fed'n of Tobaccco Growers, Inc., 195 Va. 770, 80 S.E.2d 554
(1954) (failure to exercise reasonable care).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-46 (Repl. Vol. 1978). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 26-5 (Repl. VoL
1979) (attorney's liability for loss of money through negligence or improper conduct).
8. Litigation may be one area in which an action for malpractice is not recognized. The
Tennessee Court of Appeals has held that "there can be no cause of action against an attor-
ney arising out of the manner in which he honestly chooses to present his client's case to the
trier of facts." Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tenn. App. 1976). The Stricklan
court adopted the English view articulated in Rondel v. Worsely, [1967] 1 Q.B. 443 (1966),
afl'd, [1969] 1 A.C. 191 (1967), [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1666, [1967] 3 All E.R. 993. But see Olson v.
North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 498 (1934) (a cause of action will lie for negligence in conducting
litigation). See also Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5 (1956).
9. This standard of care has been interpreted so as to require the attorney to exercise
only the degree of care which is required by community or jurisdictional standards. Coggin,
Attorney Negligence... A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 225, 227 (1958) [herein-
after cited as Coggin]. See also W. PROssER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 32 (4th ed. 1971). How-
ever, Glenn held that the requisite skill is that which is demanded by the character of the
business the attorney has undertaken. 192 Va. at 581, 66 S.E.2d at 513.
10. 231 F. 397 (4th Cir. 1916).
11. 217 Va. 763, 232 S.E.2d 774 (1977).
12. Id. at 764-65, 232 S.E.2d at 775 (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. at
401). The attorney may be "employed" even if he serves without compensation. Stephens v.
White, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) at 210-12.
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contract of employment. 13
In Oleyar v. Kerr,14 the Virginia Supreme Court eliminated the confu-
sion over which action should lie. They did so by first examining the na-
ture of the relationship between attorney and client. The court deter-
mined that the duty which flows from the attorney to the client exists
solely because of the contract of employment.15 In Oleyar, the court
stated that "[b]ut for the contract [of employment], no duty ... would
have existed."'' 6
In Oleyar, the plaintiff, Kerr, had employed the defendant attorney to
examine a title to real estate. The attorney, in his title certificate, failed
to report a judgment duly docketed against the vendor of the property.
Kerr was forced to pay the judgment amount when she reconveyed the
property. She then instituted an action for damages against her attorney,
who defended on the grounds that the action was in tort and that the one
year period of limitations had run, barring any recovery from him.17 Kerr,
having plead that the action was based on an oral contract with Oleyar,
argued that a five year statute of limitations should apply. 8 The trial
court held that the action was in tort and that a one year statute of limi-
tations should apply. However, the court decided that Kerr's action was
timely because the statute did not begin to run until the judgment was
entered against Kerr by her grantees."9
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment against the attorney on other grounds. The court stated that the
action was not one in tort, but in contract. It was not a contract in writing
allowing for a five year period of limitations, but an express or implied
contract which was governed by a three year period. 0 The action by Kerr
was therefore timely.2 In affirming the trial court, the Virginia Supreme
Court adopted "the better reasoned view.., that an action for the negli-
gence of an attorney in the performance of professional services, while
13. Keeton, Professional Malpractice, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 445, 448 (1978). See also An-
not., 49 A.L.R.2d 1216, 1219-21 (1956).
14. 217 Va. 88, 225 S.E.2d 398 (1976).
15. Id. at 90, 225 S.E.2d at 399. See also PROSSER, supra note 9, at § 92.
16. 217 Va. at 90, 225 S.E.2d at 399.
17. Id. at 89, 225 S.E.2d at 399. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (RepL Vol. 1957) (current
version at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243A (Repl. VoL 1977) (providing for a two-year statute of
limitations)).
18. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-13 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
246(2) (Repl. Vol. 1977)).
19. 217 Va. at 89, 225 S.E.2d at 399.
20. Id. at 90, 225 S.E.2d at 400 (citing McCormick v. Romans, 214 Va. 144, 198 S.E.2d 651
(1973)). See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-13 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-246(4) (Repl. Vol. 1977)).
21. 217 Va. at 90, 225 S.E.2d at 400.
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sounding in tort, is an action for breach of contract .... "22
It is now clear that the cause of action against a negligent attorney is
one which may lie in contract. But, can there be a cause of action against
an attorney in tort? The Virginia Supreme Court addressed this question
in Goodstein v. Weinberg.23 The court mentioned its Oleyar opinion, that
the action for legal malpractice was for breach of contract, but the court
further stated that an action could lie in tort if the "action was "purely in
tort' and "not merely sounding in tort.' "24 Since the client in Goodstein
was alleging fraud and willful negligence on the part of the attorney, the
court held that this action would constitute an "independent willful
tort."2 5 At first Goodstein may appear to be inconsistent with Oleyar.
However, the Goodstein court's opinion holds that while Oleyar applies
in the normal case involving attorney negligence, 8 if the act by the attor-
ney is one ordinarily in tort and the duty owed by the attorney is not one
created solely by the contractual relationship,2 7 an action in tort will also
lie.2
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A central issue in Oleyar, Goodstein and other cases of attorney mal-
practice29 was the question of which period of limitations should govern.
Under the Virginia Code, an action for breach of an oral contract is
barred three years after the action has accrued.3 0 For actions in tort, the
applicable statutory period is two years.3 1 After Oleyar, the statute of
22. Id. at 90, 225 S.E.2d at 400 (emphasis added). But see Family Say. & Loan v. Cic-
carello, 157 W. Va. 983, 207 S.E.2d 157 (1974) (cause of action depends solely on the
pleadings).
23. 219 Va. 105, 245 S.E.2d 140 (1978).
24. Id. at 109, 245 S.E.2d at 142.
25. Id.
26. The Goodstein court distinguished Oleyar. The court stated that the question in
Oleyar was one concerning "the nature of the action, whether in contract or in tort," 219 Va.
at 109, 245 S.E.2d at 142, while the question in Goodstein was whether an action "based
solely on tort liability" would lie. Id.
27. Prosser tells us that "[t]he fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in
the nature of the interest protected. Tort actions are created to protect the interest in
freedom from various kinds of harm .... Contract actions are created to protect the inter-
est in having promises performed." PROSSER, supra note 9, at § 92.
28. Since the passage of § 8.01-272 of the Virginia Code, both the contract and tort causes
of action may be joined in the same motion for judgment. In pertinent part, this section
provides that "a party may plead as many matters, whether of law or fact, as he shall think
necessary. A party may join in a claim in tort with one in contract provided that all claims
so joined arise out of the same transaction or occurrence." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-272 (Cum.
Supp. 1981).
29. See, e.g., McCormick v. Romans, 214 Va. 144, 198 S.E.2d 651 (1973).
30. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(4) (Repl. Vol. 1977). For an application of this section,
see 214 Va. 144, 198 S.E.2d 651. See also note 20 supra and accompanying text.
31. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(a) (Repl. Vol. 1977). This section is a recodified and
[Vol. 16:907
LEGAL MALPRACTICE
limitations period for the majority of actions involving legal malpractice
is the three year period provided in section 8.01-246(4) of the Virginia
Code.
Once the nature of the action and thus the applicable period of limita-
tions have been determined, the question of critical importance becomes
when the action accrued and the limitation period began to run. 2 Under
Virginia law, the statutory period begins to run when the injury or breach
occurs and not when the "resulting damage is discovered." 33 The Virginia
Supreme Court has not been disposed to alter this rule. In Virginia Mili-
tary Institute v. King, 4 an action against an architect for negligence,"5
the court stated that:
[t]he inequities that may arise from the general rule which may trigger a
statute of limitations when the injury or damage is unknown or difficult or
even incapable of discovery are apparent. Nevertheless, we believe that any
change in a rule of law that has been followed in our jurisdiction and relied
on by bench and bar for so many years should be made not by us, but by
the General Assembly, which thus far has not approved any modification.36
This general rule is mitigated somewhat by the adoption in Virginia of
the "continuing negligence" rule.37 In McCormick v. Romans,38 the court
held that "where there is an undertaking which requires a continuation of
services, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the termi-
nation of, the undertaking."30 Traditionally, the court has applied the
"continuation of services" concept to the employment relationship be-
tween attorney and client.40
In Goodstein v. Allen,4 1 the sequel to Goodstein v. Weinberg,42 the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court addressed an interesting issue concerning the stat-"
ute of limitations. While an appeal was pending in the Goodstein v.
amended version of former § 8-24 which provided for a one-year period of limitation for tort
actions of this type. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of when the action accrues, see Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 978 (1968).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See Virginia Military Instit. v. King, 217
Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977) (statute begins to run from the moment the cause of action
arises rather than from the time of discovery).
34. 217 Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977).
35. The court in King felt that the cause of action against an architect would be governed
by the same principles that would apply in an action against an attorney, citing Oleyar v.
Kerr, 217 Va. at 759, 232 S.E.2d at 899-900.
36. 217 Va. at 760, 232 S.E.2d at 900 (citations omitted).
37. Zepkin, Virginia's Continuing Negligent Treatment Rule: Farley v. Goode and Fen-
ton v. Danaceau, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 231, 237-38 (1981) (dealing principally with medical
malpractice).
38. 214 Va. 144, 198 S.E.2d 651 (1973).
39. Id. at 148, 198 S.E.2d at 654.
40. See, e.g., Beale v. Moore, 183 Va. 519, 525-26, 32 S.E.2d 696, 699 (1945).
41. 222 Va. 1, 278 S.E.2d 787 (1981).
42. 219 Va. 105, 245 S.E.2d 140. See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
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Weinberg tort action, the attorneys sued the clients for unpaid fees.43 The
clients counter-claimed and sought damages for breach of contract,
whereupon the attorneys pled the statute of limitations."" The clients ar-
gued that the three year contract statue of limitations should be tolled by
the attorneys' fraudulent concealment of their negligence and breach of
contract.45 The court held that the statute had not begun to run on their
contract action, since, in their appeal in Goodstein v. Weinberg, they had
not contested the trial court's finding that the statute had begun to run
on their tort claim.46 The court held that since "the contract remedy
arose from the same wrong as the tort remedy,. . . if the statute had not
been tolled as to one, it was not tolled as to the other. '47
V. DAMAGES
A plaintiff who successfully sues for breach of contract may recover
damages that are directly attributable to the breach. In addition, he may
be entitled to consequential damages when the special circumstances that
give rise to the consequential damages are within the contemplation of
the parties.48 In tort, a recovery of damages is extended to "afford com-
plete compensation to the injured party" and is limited only by the con-
cept of "proximate cause."4 9
In legal malpractice actions, "the burden is upon the client to prove the
damages he has suffered." 50 In Allied Productions, Inc. v. Duesterdick,51
the Virginia Supreme Court outlined the requirements necessary to re-
cover damages against an attorney. The court stated that "the extent of
the damages sustained by the complainant must be affirmatively shown;
for the attorney is only liable for the actual injury his client has received
.... )"52 It is not enough to prove that the attorney was negligent;
rather, the claimant must prove that he was damaged, and he must allege
43. 222 Va. at 3, 278 S.E.2d at 788.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 4, 278 S.E.2d at 788-89.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 4-5, 278 S.E.2d at 789.
48. Roanoke Hospital Ass'n v. Doyle & Russell, Inc., 215 Va. 796, 214 S.E.2d 155 (1975).
"[D]amages will be limited to those which were within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of the making of the contract." Coggin, supra note 9, at 232 (citing Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)).
49. Coggin, supra note 9, at 232 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162
N.E. 99 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)). Punitive damages may also be recovered if there is
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, of actual malice. See Jordon v. Sauve, 219 Va. 448,
247 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
50. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. at 403.
51. 217 Va. 763, 232 S.E.2d 774.
52. Id. at 764, 232 S.E.2d at 775 (quoting Staples v. Staples, 85 Va. 76, 85, 7 S.E. 199, 203
(1888) (emphasis added)).
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the extent of the damages in his motion for judgment.5 s Moreover, if the
claimant has had a judgment entered against him due to the attorney's
negligence, he can recover "only to the extent such judgment has been
paid." The reason given for this requirement is that the client has not
suffered an actual injury until he has paid a judgment or sustained a loss
due to the negligence of an attorney.55 As a further limitation, the claim-
ant must reduce his damage claim by any amount he has recovered from
other parties to the action.56 In addition, he is not allowed to recover, as
an element of damages, the amount of the fee paid to the negligent
attorney."
VI. CONCLUSION
After Oleyar, there should be no question as to which cause of action is
preferred in a legal malpractice claim. The court has chosen the interest
to be protected, the interest created by the contract of employment, by
focusing on the creation of the attorney-client relationship.
However, while the confusion over which action should lie has been al-
leviated, the problem associated with the running of the statute of limita-
tions remains. When should the three year period begin to run? The
court has stated that it will look to the General Assembly to pass a "dis-
covery" statute to eliminate the injured client's burden of discovering the
negligence before the statutory period has run,58 yet the court may de-
pend more on the continuing negligence rule articulated in McCormick v.
Romans as a means of easing the burden.
From the client's viewpoint, the best possible action would be one in
tort if there were a "discovery" statute. Otherwise, he must sue within the
three-year statutory period allowed for breach-of-contract actions. The
client's advantage in claiming a tort cause of action is especially obvious
when one considers the difficulty of proving damages in a legal malprac-
tice action which is based on breach of contract.
It will be interesting to follow the development of the legal malpractice
action if the General Assembly passes a "discovery" statute. Perhaps the
focus will then change from one which examines the creation of the rela-
tionship between attorney and client to one which seeks to correct inequi-
53. 217 Va. at 764, 232 S.E.2d at 775.
54. Id. at 766, 232 S.E.2d at 776.
55. Id. at 764, 232 S.E.2d at 775; See Note, Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia
Law, 63 VA. L. REv. 1491, 1495 (1977).
56. Katzenberger v. Bryan, 206 Va. 78, 85, 141 S.E.2d 671, 677 (1965) (amount paid to
claimant by third party vendor under breach of warranty of title must be subtracted from
damages alleged against attorney for negligent title investigation).
57. Hiss v. Friedberg, 201 Va. 572, 112 S.E.2d 871 (1960) (fee paid is not an element of
damage since client received benefit of negligent attorney's work).
58. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
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ties under the general rule. Otherwise, the court may simply reaffirm its
decision in Oleyar, and maintain that the action for legal malpractice is
truly one which arises in contract.
R. Paul Childress, Jr.
